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Abstract
This paper posits a two-stage game in tax regime and tax rates to study the property
of second-best emission and output taxes in a two-country world with an atmospheric
externality. It shows that (i) either the destination-destination or the origin-origin tax
regime may constitute the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game; (ii) either
regime may Pareto-dominate the other; (iii) it is possible to have a prisoner’s dilemma
game where the origin-origin regime Pareto-dominates but the choice of the destination
regime is the dominant strategy for each country. Other results include (iv) Under
origin-origin regime: the output tax is used for fiscal competition; the emission tax is
set at a rate equal to the (national) marginal social damage of emissions; and public
goods are provided sub-optimally. (v) Under destination-destination regime: the output
tax is ineffective as an instrument for fiscal competition; the emission tax is used not
only for combating pollution but also for tax competition; the tax is set at a rate below
the (national) marginal social damage of emissions; emissions are pushed above their
closed-economy level; the provision of public goods are optimal.
JEL classification: H21; H23; H73; H87; F15
Keywords: Global externality; emission taxes; output taxes; tax competition; destina-
tion regime; origin regime.
1 Introduction
In closed economies, when pollution is the only source of market failure, the design of
corrective taxes is straightforward. If there are no distortionary taxes in the economy,
the tax on emissions should reflect the social marginal damage; and the price of the
output (which incorporates both emissions and output taxes) ought simply to cover
its marginal environmental cost in addition to private costs. Moreover, the two objec-
tives can be attained using emission taxes alone. In the presence of distortionary taxes,
optimal tax rules follow the “principle of targeting”: Emission taxes are used for cor-
recting the externalities (on both dimensions), and output taxes are levied for optimal
tax considerations (i.e., to collect tax revenue and possibly to redistribute).1
Much of the debate about environmental policies these days is a global debate.2 One
reason for this is that there are serious pollution problems that have a worldwide reach.
This is true, first and foremost, for emissions of pollutants like CO2 associated with
the greenhouse effect and global warming. They produce an atmosphere externality
at the global level. Other types of emissions like SO2 have a more “local” character.
Yet, even these do not wait for custom clearance to travel across national boundaries!
A second important reason why environmental policy is a global issue is that in many
instances the pollution remedies themselves introduce an additional source of externality
between countries. We have in mind fiscal externalities that arise when the value of one
country’s tax instrument affects the welfare of another country’s residents by changing
their consumer or producer prices, and their government’s tax revenues (but that neither
1This instrument separability rests on weak separability of preferences between emissions and other
goods. See, Cremer and Gahvari (2001) who study the problem of the design of an integrated system
of second-best emission and output taxes in a closed economy setting.
2Copeland and Taylor (1995) motivate trade through income differences and show that trade worsens
the environment by making rich countries specialize in production of clean goods and poor countries
(with less stringent regulations) in dirty goods. They generalize their setup in Antweiler et al. (2001) by
including factor abundance in determining trade. There are also papers that study the impact of trade
on environmental resources; see, e.g., Chichilinisky (1994) and Karp et al. (2001) who build models of
North-South trade and motivate trade through differences in property rights.
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country takes the external effects of its fiscal policies into account in its optimization
problem). Put differently, environmental levies may be subject to fiscal competition
just like any other form of taxation.3
An important issue in designing environmental taxes in open economies is that of
the choice between “origin” and “destination” principles of taxation. Under the origin
principle, the purchasers (regardless of where they come from) pay the tax of the country
in which the good is produced; under the destination principle, the purchasers (whether
they buy the home- or foreign-produced good) pay the tax of the country in which
they reside. As far as environmental levies are concerned, emission taxes are almost
by definition origin-based taxes. The output tax, on the other hand, can be origin- or
destination-based (just like any other commodity tax). The literature contains studies
that compare the two regimes with respect to the properties of equilibrium policies.
However, none are in the context of environmental taxation and particularly not when
the interaction between emission and output taxes takes the center stage. Moreover,
the comparisons are typically carried out for given tax regimes. It is the purpose of this
paper to attempt to close these two gaps.4
We study the design of second-best output and emissions taxes in a global economy
with an atmospheric externality, while endogenizing the choice of the output tax regime.5
We do this by considering the choice of the tax regime and the tax rates (output and
emission) as a sequential game. In the first stage, the countries simultaneously choose
3See Mintz and Tulkens (1986) and Kanbur and Keen (1993) for a discussion of issues pertaining to
commodity tax competition. Cremer et al. (1996), Wilson (1999), Wellisch (2000) and Haufler (2001)
present general surveys of the tax competition literature.
4Lockwood et al. (1994) derive an equivalence between the two systems based on fixed tax rates
and uniform commodity taxes either within a country or across the two countries. Lockwood (1993)
compares the two regimes in a setting where tax rates are determined endogenously as the outcome
of a non-cooperative Nash game. He shows, through examples, that either origin or destination tax
systems can result in higher welfare levels. Keen and Lahiri (1998) also examine this question but under
imperfect competition. See Lockwood (2001) for other references.
5There are papers in the literature with transboundary pollution which emphasize strategic trade
consideration; see, e.g., Conrad (1993), Barrett (1994), and Kennedy (1994). However, these papers are
partial equilibrium in nature and model imperfectly competitive environments. As such, they do not
explore the full interactions between tax competition and transboundary pollution.
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their output tax regime. Then, in the second stage, they (simultaneously) set their tax
instruments given the first-stage-selected output tax regime. The subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of this game determines the countries’ output tax regimes, and the values of
their emission and output taxes. We posit a simple setting with two identical countries
whose inhabitants consume a publicly-provided and two privately-provided goods: a
non-polluting numeraire good and a polluting consumption good. Every consumer has
an endowment of the numeraire good, some of which he consumes, spending the rest to
purchase the polluting good and pay taxes.
Pollution (CO2, SO2, etc.) is global and a by-product of production. The polluting
good may be produced in different ways. Each procedure entails a different resource cost
and a different emission level. A higher level of emission reduces the private (per unit)
production costs of polluting goods. That is, the production costs of polluting goods
are negatively related to their emissions. This is to capture the fact that technologies
which cut emissions are more expensive to employ.6 Firms producing the polluting
good operate in a competitive environment. It is produced, for a given unit cost of
production, by a linear technology subject to constant returns to scale.
The polluting good is produced and consumed in both countries. To simplify the
exposition, the demand for this good is assumed to be perfectly inelastic.7 While the
physical characteristics of the home- and foreign-produced goods are identical, con-
sumers have a preference for purchasing the home-produced goods. We model this by
assuming that consumers experience a certain disutility when they consume one unit
of the foreign-produced good. The extent of the disutility differs across consumers.
Individuals have otherwise identical quasi-linear preferences.
We show that under the origin system of taxation, the output tax is used for fiscal
6Antweiler et al. (2001) allow for abatement and distinguish between scale of output and the intensity
of polluting technologies in determining emissions, but their concern is not tax competition and public
good provision.
7See Cremer and Gahvari (2004) for the analysis of the case where demand for the polluting good
varies with its price.
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competition. As a result, the “rule” for the provisons of public good is distorted. This
distortion is translated into an under-provision of public goods (as compared to its
closed-economy level which is also the first-best level). With the availability of the
output tax, the emission tax is used to curb emissions and set equal to the marginal
social damage of emissions. Nevertheless, because the public good is provided sub-
optimally, emissions exceed their closed-economy level. Under the destination system
of taxation, on the other hand, the output tax does not affect a country’s export price
and thus cannot be used for fiscal competition. This is good news for the provision of
public goods which remains first-best optimal (both in terms of rule as well as level).
The ineffectiveness of output taxes for fiscal competition leads to the use of emission
taxes for this purpose; however. The emission tax rate is set at less than the marginal
social damage of emissions, and emissions are pushed above their closed-economy level.8
Comparing the equilibria under origin-origin and destination-destination taxes di-
rectly, we thus have a suboptimal level of public good provision under the former, and an
optimal level under the latter regime. On this score alone, the destination-destination
regime is superior to origin-origin regime. However, the tax regimes’ differential impacts
on emission levels may reverse this ranking. While both regimes imply higher pollution
levels than the closed-economy solution, either regime may result in a higher pollu-
tion level (as compared to the other). This suggests that for the origin-origin regime to
Pareto dominate the destination-destination regime, it must necessarily result in a lower
emission level. Nevertheless, when emission levels are lower under origin-origin regime,
it is still possible that the destination-destination regime will be better. We present
examples where one or the other tax system leads to higher environmental quality and
overall welfare levels.
Finally, with respect to the equilibrium tax regime, we show that either the origin-
origin or the destination-destination regime may constitute the subgame perfect Nash
8The targeting issue has been noted in the literature; see, e.g., Barrett (1994). Again, this has been
studied within a partial equilibrium framework with restricted instruments.
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equilibrium of the two-stage game in the tax regime and the tax rates. Interestingly,
it is also possible to have a prisoner’s dilemma game where the origin-origin regime
Pareto-dominates but the choice of the destination regime is the dominant strategy for
each country.
2 The basics
Consider two identical countries in isolation, each with a population size normalized at
one.9 Their inhabitants consume three goods: one publicly-provided and two privately-
provided goods. The publicly-provided good, G, is nonpolluting. Each country provides
G to its own residents only. One of the privately-provided good is the numeraire good
which is also nonpolluting. The other privately-provided good, x, is polluting. The
demand for this good is perfectly inelastic so that everyone consumes only one unit of it
regardless of the price.10 Every consumer has an endowment ofm units of the numeraire
good, some of which he consumes, spending the rest to purchase the polluting good.
Production technologies are identical in both countries. The publicly-provided good is
produced at a constant average and marginal cost which we can normalize at one. The
polluting good may be produced in different ways. Each procedure entails a different
resource cost and a different emission level.11 Specifically, assume that the resource
cost of producing one unit of output C(e), where e denotes emission per unit of output
in country i, is a continuously differentiable, decreasing and convex function of e.12
Firms producing the polluting good operate in a competitive environment. The good
9One need not distinguish between the two countries in this section. All variables indicate the values
attained in each country.
10This assumption is adopted for analytical simplicity. Allowing for x to depend negatively on price,
does not change the main points of the paper. See Cremer and Gahvari (2004) who adopt this more
general specification.
11This models situations where a polluting good may be produced through different production tech-
niques, or using different polluting inputs where each particular input entails a different emission level.
Different abatement techniques also imply that a unit of polluting good is associated with different
emission levels.
12More precisely the assumption is that C0(.) < 0 for all e up to some limit e¯, and that C0(e¯) = 0.
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is produced by an industry that is comprised of a fixed but sufficiently large number
of identical firms. It is produced, for a given C(e), by a linear technology subject to
constant returns to scale.
Each country uses two (distortionary) tax instruments, output and emission taxes;
lump-sum taxation is ruled out.13 The output tax is levied at τ (dollars) per unit on
consumers and the emission tax at t (dollars) per unit of emissions on firms.14 Tax
revenues, from both sources, are used to finance the provision of the public good, G.
Denote the consumer and the producer price of x by p and q. Given the constant returns
to scale assumption, the firm’s profit maximization problem is simply one of maximizing
profits per unit of output. That is, the firm chooses e to maximize
q − C(e)− te.
This yields
−C 0(e) = t, (1)
where the second-order condition C 00(e) > 0 is satisfied from the convexity of C(.).
Moreover, the zero-profit condition implies that
q = C(e)− C 0(e)e, (2)
p = C(e)− C 0(e)e+ τ . (3)
Consumers have identical quasi-linear preferences. When they buy the home-produced
goods, their preferences are represented by the indirect (conditional) utility function
u = m− p+ φ(G)− ϕ(E), (4)
where
E = 2e, (5)
13Again, allowing for lump-sum taxation does not change the message of the paper. See Cremer and
Gahvari (2004) who formally discuss the implications of allowing for lump-sum taxes.
14It is natural to assume that the emission taxes are levied on firms. As to the commodity taxes, this
is of no consequence for this section. However, with our emphasis on destination versus origin taxes, it
is also natural to assume right from the outset that the output tax is levied on consumers.
6
denotes global emissions. We assume that φ(.) is a continuously differentiable, increasing
and concave function of its argument while ϕ(.) is continuously differentiable, increasing
and convex; that is, φ0(.) > 0, φ00(.) < 0 and ϕ0(.) > 0, ϕ00(.) > 0.
2.1 Optimal benchmark
With identical consumers and countries, it is natural to adopt a utilitarian perspective
on social welfare. It is plain that the globally optimal allocation is symmetric. The
welfare of one country can then be measured by the utility of its representative individ-
ual. The optimum is characterized by maximizing equation (4) subject to a country’s
resource constraint, or equivalently its government budget constraint. Thus assume a
“centralized authority” chooses τ and t to maximize (4) subject to
G = te+ τ = p− C(e), (6)
where p is related to τ by (3) and e is determined by t according to (1). The optimization
problem must allow for a full accounting of the damage of emissions–including that
imposed by one country on the other. This implies that E varies with e on the basis of
(5). Solving the first-order conditions for this problem yields15
Proposition 1 Assume that countries set their environmental policies cooperatively.
The optimal allocations, and the supporting prices and tax instruments, are characterized
by equations (1), (3), (5), (6), and
15The Lagrangian associated with this problem is
∆ = m− [C(e) + te+ τ ] + φ(G)− ϕ(2e) + λ(te+ τ −G),
with the first-order conditions:
∂∆
∂τ
= −1 + λ = 0,
∂∆
∂t
= e(λ− 1) +
£
λt− 2ϕ0(E)
¤ ∂e
∂t
= 0,
∂∆
∂G
= φ0(G)− λ = 0.
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φ0(G) = 1, (7)
−C 0(e) = 2ϕ0(E). (8)
Observe that equation (7) determines the value of G and equation (8) the value of
e (and E); they are determined independently of one another.16 The value of p is then
determined via equation (6), resulting in a value for τ from (3). The output tax here is
thus non-distortionary. Equation (8) indicates that emission taxes are levied to achieve
the Pigouvian rule of equalizing the private benefits of a marginal increase in emissions
[reducing production costs by −C0(e)] to its marginal global damage, 2ϕ0(E).
2.2 Closed-economy allocations
In characterizing the globally optimal allocation, we assumed that each country takes
the damage its emissions impose on the other country fully into account. We now assume
that governments choose the values of their fiscal instruments (which determine their
emission levels) simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Their objective is to maximize
the welfare of their own residents only. Solving the “best-reply” functions for the two
countries, assuming a symmetric Nash-equilibrium, leads to17
16That the values of G and e are independent of one another, also implies that the optimal values
of τ and t (output and emission taxes) are independent of one another. This feature is due to the
assumption of an inelastic demand for x. See Cremer and Gahvari (2001).
17The Lagrangian associated with one country’s problem is
∆ = m− [C(e) + te+ τ ] + φ(G)− ϕ(e+ eˆ) + λ(te+ τ −G),
where eˆ is the other countries emission level treated as given. The first-order conditions are:
∂∆
∂τ
= −1 + λ = 0,
∂∆
∂t
= e(λ− 1) +
£
λt− ϕ0(E)
¤ ∂e
∂t
= 0,
∂∆
∂G
= φ0(G)− λ = 0.
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Proposition 2 The equilibrium allocations, and the supporting prices and taxes, in a
closed economy are characterized by equations (1), (3), (5), (6) and
φ0(G) = 1, (9)
−C 0(e) = ϕ0(E). (10)
Observe that condition equation (9) yields the first-best value of G. This is not
surprising. The assumption of inelastic demand implies that in a closed economy the
output tax is non-distortionary. On the other hand, condition (10) which determines the
second-best emission rule in a closed-economy, differs from the Pigouvian rule: −C 0(e) is
equated to ϕ0(E) rather than 2ϕ0(E). The reason for this is that each country equalizes
the marginal private benefits of increasing emissions to its marginal social damage, with
“social” being defined as the country’s own residents only (the damage on the residents
of the other country is ignored). We shall refer to this adjusted rule as the “internal”
Pigouvian rule for combating emissions.
3 International trade
The previous section has shown that with transboundary pollution (but in the absence
of trade), Nash-equilibrium environmental policies are inefficient. This does of course
not come as a surprise. When markets open, the pollution remedies (namely the out-
put and the emission taxes) themselves introduce an additional source of externality
between countries. We have in mind fiscal externalities that arise when the value of one
country’s tax instrument affects the welfare of another country’s residents by changing
their consumer or producer prices, and their government’s tax revenues (but that neither
country takes the external effects of its fiscal policies into account in its optimization
problem). Put differently, environmental levies may be subject to fiscal competition
just like any other form of taxation. We now turn to the study of this fiscal externality
and its interaction with the emission related externality.
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Figure 1. The countries, their inhabitants and the marginal consumer
With trade across borders, citizens of each country will be able to purchase the
polluting good from the foreign country. While the physical characteristics of the home-
and foreign-produced goods are identical, consumers have a preference for purchasing
the home-produced goods. Let θ denote the inhabitants ofA andB, with |θ| determining
θ’s disutility when consuming one unit of the foreign-produced good. Assume that θ
is uniformly distributed over [-1, 1], with a negative θ indicating a resident of B and a
positive θ a resident of A; see Figure 1.
Denote the utility level of a person in j = A,B who purchases the polluting good
produced in i = A,B by uji , the price he pays for the polluting good by p
j
i , the level
of publicly-provided good in country i = A,B by Gi, and the total (i.e. across both
countries) emission level by E. We have, given the stipulated quasi-linear preferences,(
ujj = m− p
j
j + φ(Gj)− ϕ(E),
uji = m− p
j
i − δ|θ|+ φ(Gj)− ϕ(E), with j 6= i,
(11)
where δ > 0 is a “dislike index”.
When a resident of country j buys the home-produced good, his net cost of pur-
chasing one unit of the good is simply its consumer price, pjj . On the other hand, when
he buys the foreign-produced good, he incurs a net (utility) cost of pji + δ|θ|. We thus
have, ujj = u(p
j
j , Gj , E) and u
j
i = u(p
j
i + δ|θ|, Gj , E). Denote the “marginal” consumer,
i.e. the person who is just indifferent between buying home- or foreign-produced goods,
by θ˜. Note that all individuals to the left of θ˜ buy the good from country B, and all
10
the individuals to the right of θ˜ buy the good from country A. The value of E is then
determined according to
E = eB(1 + θ˜) + eA(1− θ˜), (12)
regardless of which country θ˜ lies in.
If the marginal consumer is a resident of A (θ˜ ≥ 0), uAA = uAB ⇒ u(pAA, GA, E) =
u(pAB + δθ˜, GA, E). Consequently,
θ˜ =
pAA − pAB
δ
, if θ˜ ≥ 0. (13)
Similarly, if θ˜ is a resident of B (θ˜ < 0), uBB = u
B
A ⇒ u(pBB, GB, E) = u(pBA − δθ˜, GB, E).
Hence
θ˜ =
pBA − pBB
δ
, if θ˜ < 0. (14)
Let Wi (i = A,B) denote the utilitarian measure of welfare for country i. It is then the
case that
WA = m+ φ(GA)− ϕ(E)− (1− θ˜)pAA −
Z θ˜
0
(pAB + δθ)dθ
= m+ φ(GA)− ϕ(E)− pAA +
δ
2
θ˜
2
, if θ˜ ≥ 0, (15)
WA = m+ φ(GA)− ϕ(E)− pAA, if θ˜ < 0. (16)
Similarly,
WB = m+ φ(GB)− ϕ(E)− pBB, if θ˜ ≥ 0, (17)
WB = m+ φ(GB)− ϕ(E)− (1 + θ˜)pBB −
Z 0
θ˜
(pBA − δθ)dθ,
= m+ φ(GB)− ϕ(E)− pBB +
δ
2
θ˜
2
. if θ˜ < 0. (18)
The emission tax, being levied on firms, is “origin-based”. The output tax, on the
other hand, may be either origin-based as well or levied on the basis of destination
principle. The next sections studies the countries’ choice of the tax regime, as well as
the properties of the resulting equilibria.
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4 Tax regime and tax rate competition: the two-stage
game
When deciding upon the overall tax policy, involving the choice of regimes and tax rates,
it is natural to consider a sequential procedure (or game). We consider the following
specification. In the first stage, the countries simultaneously choose their output tax
regime Ri ∈ {O,D} i = A,B (O stands for origin and D for destination). Then, in
the second stage, they (simultaneously) set their tax instruments t and τ , given the
first-stage-selected output tax regime. We shall determine the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of this game.
The game is solved by backward induction. We start by characterizing the tax com-
petition equilibrium in the second stage subgames induced by the regime choice. These
are: (O,O), (D,D) and (O,D); the fourth possible subgame (D,O) is symmetrical to
(O,D). Observe that even though we concentrate on symmetrical equilibria, it is nec-
essary to study the “asymmetric” second stage subgames. This is because a unilateral
deviation from (O,O) or (D,D) yields an asymmetric second stage. To determine the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the two stage game we thus have to determine the equi-
librium payoffs in all possible second stage subgames, including the asymmetric regime
cases.
5 Tax rate competition: the second stage equilibrium
5.1 Origin-origin regime: the (O,O) subgame
Denote the producer price of x in country i by qi = C(ei)−C 0(ei)ei, and its commodity
tax by τ i. Under origin principle of taxation, the purchasers (regardless of where they
come from) pay the tax of the country in which the good is produced. Thus, under this
principle, we have (
pjj = qj + τ j ,
pji = qi + τ i, with j 6= i.
(19)
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Hence pji = qi+ τ i = p
i
i, and all purchasers of x produced in i pay the same price for it,
regardless of where they reside. Denote this by pi. It then follows from equations (13)
and (14) that the expression for θ˜ will be given by
θ˜ =
pA − pB
δ
, (20)
regardless of which country sells the good at a higher price.
With C(ei) being the cost of producing one unit of the good in country i and pi
its consumer price, its production and sale will generate pi − C(ei) in revenues for the
government of i. Assuming the governments ofA andB undertake no other expenditures
or transfers except for G, which is produced at a fixed unit cost normalized at one, their
budget constraints are, whether pA ≥ pB or pA < pB,
GA(pA, eA; pB) = [pA − C(eA)] (1− θ˜), (21)
GB(pB, eB; pA) = [pB −C(eB)] (1 + θ˜). (22)
The following Proposition, proved in the Appendix, gives the characterizations for
equilibrium output and emission taxes.
Proposition 3 The symmetric Nash equilibrium allocations, and the supporting prices
and taxes, in the (O,O) subgame are characterized (for i = A,B) by equations (1),
(3),(5), (6), and
Gi = δ
φ0(Gi)− 1
φ0(Gi)
, (23)
−C 0(ei) =
ϕ0(E)
φ0(Gi)
. (24)
Observe that the rule for the determination of Gi changes from that in the closed-
economy. Indeed, from (23), it follows that φ0(Gi) > 1 and Gi will be lower than its
closed-economy solution (equal to its first-best value). On the other hand, equation
(24) shows that the internal Pigouvian rule governing the determination of ei remains
intact. We will come back to this in the next section.
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5.2 Destination-destination regime: the (D,D)
Under destination principle of taxation, the purchasers (whether they buy the home-
or foreign-produced good) pay the tax of the country in which they reside. Under this
principle, we have
(
pjj = qj + τ j ,
pji = qi + τ j , with j 6= i.
(25)
The marginal consumer is now given by
θ˜ =
qA − qB
δ
. (26)
Contrasting this expression with (20), its counterpart in the origin-origin regime, it
is apparent that consumer prices have been replaced by producer prices. Thus, under
destination-destination regime, only ei determines who the marginal consumer is; τ j has
no impact. This property implies that emission taxes are the only potential instruments
for tax competition. One can then easily establish that, regardless of which country θ˜
resides in, the budget constraints for the governments of A and B are given by18
GA = −eAC 0(eA)(1− θ˜) + τA, (27)
GB − eBC 0(eB)(1 + θ˜) + τB. (28)
We prove the following proposition in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 The symmetric Nash equilibrium allocations, and the supporting prices
and taxes, in the (D,D) subgame are characterized (for i = A,B) by equations (1),
18For instance, if the marginal consumer is a resident of A, then θ˜ ≥ 0 and qA ≥ qB. Thus
GA = [pA − C(eA)] (1− θ˜) + θ˜τA = −eAC0(eA)(1− θ˜) + τA,
GB = [pB − C(eB)] (1 + θ˜)− θ˜τB = −eBC0(eB)(1 + θ˜) + τB.
The corresponding expressions for θ˜ < 0 are derived in a similar way.
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(3),(5), (6), and
φ0(Gi) = 1, (29)
−C 0(ei) =
ϕ0(E)
1 + e2iC 00(ei)/δ
. (30)
Observe that under the destination-destination solution, it is the rule for determiningGi,
and its value, which remains unaffected by tax competition.19 The internal Pigouvian
rule, on the other hand, changes.
5.3 Origin-destination regime: the (O,D) subgame
Assume that A chooses to set its output tax on the basis of origin principle, and B on
the basis of destination principle. The opposite case of A choosing destination principle
and B origin principle is found in a similar manner.
We have:
pAA = qA + τA; p
A
B = qB;
pBA = qA + τA + τB; p
B
B = qB + τB.
(31)
Lack of symmetry between pAB and p
B
A suggests that in this case, we have to examine the
solutions for θ˜ ≥ 0 (marginal consumer in origin regime country) and θ˜ < 0 (marginal
consumer in destination regime country) separately.
Assume the marginal consumer is in the origin regime country A so that θ˜ ≥ 0. It
follows from the expressions for pAA and p
A
B in (31) that,
θ˜ =
pAA − pAB
δ
=
qA + τA − qB
δ
. (32)
19This result is due to the assumption of an inelastic demand for the polluting good. Cremer and
Gahvari (2004) show that when demand varies with price, an increase in the home country’s output
price imposes a negative fiscal externality on the foreign country. In turn, this implies that the home
country’s output tax is above its optimal price, and may lead to “too much” public goods in the home
country. The fiscal externality arises because an increase in the home country’s output tax may reduce
the tax revenues of the foreign country. The mechanism for this is the reduction in the demand of
the residents of the home country for the goods of the foreign country, caused by an increase in the
price they have to pay for the foreign country’s good (because of the increase in the output tax of the
home country). Less purchases of foreign goods then leads to less emission tax revenues for the foreign
country. Observe also that such a fiscal externality is not present with origin taxes.
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Observe that only τA appears in the formula for θ˜. That is, the output tax affect the
position of the marginal consumer only if it is levied on the basis of the origin principle.
Moreover, given the pattern of taxation in the two countries,
GA =
£
pAA − C(eA)
¤
(1− θ˜), (33)
GB = pBB − C(eB)− θ˜eBC 0(eB). (34)
We prove the following proposition in the Appendix.
Proposition 5 The Nash equilibrium allocations, and the supporting prices and taxes,
in the (O,D) subgame are determined by equations (1), (3), (32), (33), (34), (12) and
∙
1− θ˜ − 1
δ
τA +
1
δ
eBC 0(eA)
¸
φ0(GA) = 1− θ˜, (35)
− C 0(eA) =
ϕ0(E)
φ0(GA)
, (36)
φ0(GB) = 1, (37)£
C 0(eB) + ϕ0(E)
¤ ∙
1 + θ˜ +
1
δ
e2BC
00(eB)
¸
= eBC 00(eB)
∙
eAϕ0(E)
δ
− θ˜
¸
, (38)
provided that the equilibrium value of θ˜ ≥ 0.
Observe that country A which adheres to origin principle continues to follow the
internal Pigouvian rule. That is, the decision of country A with respect to its emission
is independent of the tax regime chosen by B. This is not the case with respect to A’s
choice of an output tax, as seen by equation (35). On the other hand, country B which
adheres to destination principle continues to set GB at its first-best value. In country
B’s case, it is the choice of GB which is independent of the other country’s tax regime.
Its choice of an emission tax, however, is affected by A’s regime choice; see equation
(38).
The case where θ˜ < 0 is treated along the same line and presented in the Appendix.
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6 Tax rate competition: equilibria versus closed-economy
solution
To understand how tax competition operates under each of the possible regime combi-
nations, we compare the second stage equilibria to the closed-economy solution. In the
absence of trade, the distinction between origin and destination taxes is plainly irrele-
vant. Consequently, one can use this solution as a common benchmark for comparison
with the three possible tax rate competition equilibria.
Recall that the closed-economy solution for i = A,B is characterized by:
φ0(Gi) = 1,
− C 0(ei) =
ϕ0(E)
φ0(Gi)
= ϕ0(E).
Under (O,O), the characterization of the solution changes to
φ0(Gi) > 1,
− C 0(ei) =
ϕ0(E)
φ0(Gi)
=
ϕ0(E)
1 +Gi/(δ −Gi)
.
The change in the first condition implies a change in the “rule” for determining Gi (or
alternatively τ i) as well as the equilibrium “level” of Gi. The new rule tells us that at the
equilibrium value of Gi, its marginal valuation exceeds one (i.e. MCPFi > 1). Under
origin taxes, a country can use its commodity tax to potentially lower the price of its
output and to attract the other country’s buyers. Thus the commodity tax is no-longer
non-distortionary. This also explains why MCPFi > 1. The change in the “level” of
Gi follows the change in the “rule” and in the expected direction. With φ0(Gi) > 1, the
level of Gi falls below its closed-economy solution (which is also first-best). This results
in a lowering of the welfare for the countries’ residents. On the other hand, given that
τ i − C 0(ei)ei = Gi, the reduction in Gi also implies a reduction in τ i (for the same ei).
This leads to a reduction in pi, mitigating the welfare-reduction due to the lowering of
Gi.
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As far as the second condition is concerned, the “rule” for the determination of emis-
sion levels remains unchanged (in comparison to the closed-economy solution). However,
the persistence of the rule does not translate into a non-changing pollution “level”. With
φ0(Gi) > 1, the condition implies −C 0(ei) < ϕ0(E), so that ei increases. This is also
welfare reducing. Consequently, as compared to the closed-economy solution, welfare
will definitely decline.
In the destination-destination regime taxes, we have for i = A,B,
φ0(Gi) = 1,
− C 0(ei) =
ϕ0(E)
1 + e2iC 00(ei)/δ
< ϕ0(E).
Now, the first condition remains unchanged from that in the closed-economy. This
translates not just into an unchanged “rule” for the determination of Gi, but also in a
level that remains unchanged. Thus, for the same ei, there will be no change in pi (from
Gi = pi−C(ei)) and no change in welfare either. Observe that with destination taxes, a
country cannot use τ i to influence the price of its output. This renders commodity taxes
useless as an instrument for fiscal competition. This is also why the MCPFi remains
unchanged at one.
In the case of the second condition, we now have −C 0(ei) < ϕ0(E)/φ0(Gi). Hence
the benefit of increasing pollution is set at a level below its marginal social damage.
Moreover, the change in the rule translates into a change in the level, and in the expected
direction. With −C 0(ei) < ϕ0(E), ei increases and welfare goes down. Essentially, what
happens in this case is that, with the commodity tax not being a useful instrument for
fiscal competition, the countries resort to the competition in emission taxes (leading to
emission increases) as the means of lowering their prices and attracting the residents of
the other country.
The above comparisons are with respect to the closed-economy solution. When
comparing the equilibria under origin-origin and destination-destination taxes directly,
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we have that Gi will always be lower (and sub-optimal) under the origin-origin regime.
If this were the only change, one would of course expect that destination-destination
regime to dominate origin-origin regime in terms of welfare. However, the second factor
that comes into play is the level of pollution under the two regimes. Both regimes imply
higher pollution levels than the closed-economy solution. The important point is that,
compared to each other, either regime may result in a higher pollution level. This can
potentially reverse the ranking of the two tax systems. The foregoing argument also
suggests that whenever emissions are lower under destination-destination regime, this
regime is the better one. The converse is not necessarily true. When emission levels
are lower under origin-origin regime, it is still possible that the destination-destination
regime will be better. The possibilities are demonstrated in the following section via
examples.
Turning to the asymmetric tax regime, we have already seen that in this case the
country which adheres to the origin principle continues to follow the internal Pigouvian
rule regardless of the other country’s regime [−C 0(eA) = ϕ0(E)/φ0(GA)]. Similarly, we
observed that the country which adheres to the destination principle chooses an efficient
level of public goods regardless of the other country’s regime [φ0(GB) = 1]. At the same
time, the choice of GA and eB will be subject to distortions.
Finally, having characterized the equilibrium in all the possible second stage sub-
games, we are now in a position to examine the (first stage) regime choice. However,
at this level of generality, an unambiguous ranking of the two countries’ payoffs in the
different induced subgames is not possible. To achieve some understanding of the first
stage (strategic regime choice), we thus consider a series of illustrative numerical exam-
ples. Though restrictive, these examples are very effective in highlighting a number of
interesting configurations that can effectively arise.
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7 Tax regime competition: illustrative examples
Consider the following specification:
C(ei) =
b(1− ei)2
2
, (39)
φ(Gi) = a ln(Gi), (40)
ϕ(E) = ϕE. (41)
Tables 1—3 present three typical cases, based on different parameter values for a, b, δ
and ϕ. In all the calculations, m = 4. In Table 1, (D,D) is better for both A and
B than (O,O). As we lower the value of a, the ranking will change and (O,O) will
dominate (D,D); see Table 2. Nevertheless, (D,D) remains the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. This is very interesting in that it indicates the possibility of having a
prisoner’s dilemma game: Even though (O,O) Pareto-dominates, D is the dominant
strategy for each country.20
As to the intuition behind the change in ranking, observe first that in Table 1, the
(D,D) regime is better despite its entailing a higher emission level than the (O,O)
regime. The dominance of the (D,D) regime is thus due to its leaving the choice of G
undistorted, while G is under-supplied under the (O,O) regime. Now a reduction in
a implies a reduction in the consumers’ valuation of the public good. This makes the
under-provision of G under (O,O) to be less important. And with pollution being lower
under (O,O), this becomes the Pareto superior system.
The lowering the value of a further will switch the equilibrium to (O,O) as well.
This is depicted in Table 3. Other parameter values also have an impact on the ranking
and the type of equilibrium. Increasing b from its value under Table 1, makes both
regimes to be more polluting, with the (D,D) regime remaining as the more polluting
20In the reduced game obtained by backward induction.
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Table 1. Origin/origin; destination/destination; origin(A)/destination(B)
(a = 1; b = 4; δ = 40;ϕ = 0.055)
Origin/Origin Destination/Destination Origin(A)/Destination(B)
GA 0.975610 1.0 0.974562
GB 0.975610 1.0 1.0
eA 0.986585 0.987472 0.986600
eB 0.986585 0.987472 0.968490
pAA 0.975970 1.000310 0.996655
pBB 0.975970 1.000310 0.999323
θ˜ 0.0 0.0 0.021815
pAB 0.124056
E 1.973170 1.974940 1.954690
WA 2.890810 2.891060 2.879590
WB 2.890810 2.891060 2.893170
Table 2. Origin/origin; destination/destination; origin(A)/destination(B)
(a = 0.1; b = 4; δ = 40;ϕ = 0.055)
Origin/Origin Destination/Destination Origin(A)/Destination(B)
GA 0.099751 1.0 0.099750
GB 0.099751 1.0 0.1
eA 0.986284 0.987472 0.986284
eB 0.986284 0.987472 0.986428
pAA 0.100127 0.100314 0.100242
pBB 0.100127 0.100314 0.100306
θ˜ 0.0 0.0 0.001158
pAB 0.053920
E 1.972570 1.974940 1.972710
WA 3.560870 3.560810 3.560780
WB 3.560870 3.560810 3.560940
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Table 3. Origin/origin; destination/destination; origin(A)/destination(B)
(a = 0.05; b = 4; δ = 40;ϕ = 0.055)
Origin/Origin Destination/Destination Origin(A)/Destination(B)
GA 0.049938 0.05 0.049938
GB 0.049938 0.05 0.05
eA 0.986267 0.987472 0.986267
eB 0.986267 0.987472 0.987460
pAA 0.050315 0.050314 0.050315
pBB 0.050315 0.050314 0.050314
θ˜ 0.0 0.0 0.000012
pAB 0.049847
E 1.972530 1.974940 1.973730
WA 3.691350 3.691280 3.691280
WB 3.691350 3.691280 3.691340
regime.21 It also remains the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Reducing b from its
value under Table 1, on the other hand, reduces pollution under both regimes. However,
it also makes the (D,D) regime less polluting that the (O,O) regime. Consequently,
(D,D) regimes remains Pareto superior to (O,O) regime as well as being the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. The nature and the ranking of the equilibria thus remains
the same as that in Table 1.
The same is true with respect to possible changes in δ, the “dislike index” of for-
eign products. Observe that at very high values of δ, the two regimes approach the
closed-economy solution and thus coincide. Lowering δ, on the other hand, lowers the
equilibrium value of G under the (O,O) system making its under-provision more acute.
Consequently, the (D,D) regime retains its superiority.
Finally, we observe that the effect of changing the marginal social damage of emis-
sions on the ranking and the nature of the equilibria is, unlike those of the changes
in a, b and δ, non-monotonic. Initially, as we increase the value of ϕ from its value
21In fact, as b → ∞, under both regimes e → 1, and the under-provision of G in the origin-origin
system remains as the sole determining factor in its being the Pareto-inferior outcome.
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Table 4. Origin/origin; destination/destination; origin(A)/destination(B)
(a = 1; b = 4; δ = 40;ϕ = 0.25)
Origin/Origin Destination/Destination Origin(A)/Destination(B)
GA 0.975610 1.0 0.974801
GB 0.975610 1.0 1.0
eA 0.939024 0.942600 0.939075
eB 0.939024 0.942600 0.927312
pAA 0.983046 1.006590 1.000090
pBB 0.983046 1.006590 1.005710
θ˜ 0.0 0.0 0.017998
pAB 0.280183
E 1.878050 1.885200 1.866180
WA 2.522750 2.522110 2.514320
WB 2.522750 2.522110 2.527740
under Table 1, the (O,O) system will not only keep its less-polluting property, but it
also becomes the Pareto superior outcome. Nevertheless, (D,D) remains the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. Again, we have another example of the prisoner’s dilemma
game. This situation is depicted in Table 4. However, as we increase ϕ further, the
(O,O) regime becomes more polluting and Pareto-inferior; (D,D) remains the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. This situation is depicted in Table 5.
8 Conclusion
This paper has studied the design of second-best output and emissions taxes in a global
economy with an atmospheric externality, while endogenizing the choice of the output
tax regime. It has modeled the choice of the tax regime and the tax rates (output
and emission) as a sequential game. In the first stage, the countries simultaneously
choose their output tax regime (emission taxes, almost by definition, must be origin
based.) In the second stage, they (simultaneously) set their tax instruments, given the
first-stage-selected output tax regime. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this
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Table 5. Origin/origin; destination/destination; origin(A)/destination(B)
(a = 1; b = 4; δ = 40;ϕ = 2.5)
Origin/Origin Destination/Destination Origin(A)/Destination(B)
GA 0.975610 1.0 0.975946
GB 0.975610 1.0 1.0
eA 0.390244 0.384086 0.390034
eB 0.390244 0.384086 0.384077
pAA 1.719210 1.758700 1.720440
pBB 1.719210 1.758700 1.758360
θ˜ 0.0 0.0 0.0003868
pAB 1.704970
E 0.780488 0.768172 0.774108
WA 0.304873 0.320870 0.319943
WB 0.304873 0.320870 0.306373
game constitutes the countries’ output tax regimes, and the values of their emission and
output taxes. Six general lessons have emerged.
First, under origin-origin regime, the principle of targeting that governs taxation
of outputs and emissions in closed economies continues to apply. Output taxes are
levied for optimal tax considerations and, in open economies, for the purpose of tax
competition as well; emission taxes are used solely for control of pollution. Specifically,
the competition in output tax results in the distortion of the “rule” for the provision
of public goods. This distortion is translated into an under-provision of public goods
(as compared to their closed-economy level which is also the first-best level). The
characterization of the emission tax remains the same as in the closed economy, and
equal to the marginal social damage of emissions (nationally). Nevertheless, because
the public good is provided sub-optimally, emissions exceed their closed-economy level.
Second, because the output tax is not an effective instrument for tax competition
under destination-destination regime, it causes the principle of targeting to break down.
Emission taxes are used not only to control pollution, but for tax competition as well.
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Specifically, the absence of competition in output taxes implies that the provision of
public goods remains first-best optimal (both in terms of rule as well as level). The
competition in emission taxes implies that the emission tax is set below the marginal
social damage of emissions (nationally), and emissions are pushed above their closed-
economy level.
Third, either tax regime may Pareto-dominate the other. The destination-destination
regime tends to be better because it results in the the optimal provision of public goods.
However, a substantially higher level of pollution under this regime may reverse that
ranking. This is more likely to occur, the lower is the consumers’ valuation of pub-
lic goods relative to private goods. This reduces the welfare implications of the sub-
optimal provision of public goods under the origin-origin regime. Fourth, either the
destination-destination or the origin-origin regime may constitute the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the two-stage game between the two countries. Fifth, the likelihood
of the origin-origin regime to be the equilibrium outcome of the game increases as the
utility of the public goods relative to the private goods decreases. Sixth, it is possible
to have a prisoner’s dilemma game where the origin-origin regime Pareto-dominates but
the choice of the destination regime is the dominant strategy for each country.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3: Partially differentiate equation (15) with respect τA and tA,
and equation (17) with respect to τB and tB. We have
∂WA
∂τA
= −∂p
A
A
∂τA
+ δθ˜
∂θ˜
∂τA
+ φ0(GA)
∂GA
∂τA
− ϕ0(E) ∂E
∂τA
= 0, (A1)
∂WA
∂tA
= − 1
C00(eA)
"
−∂p
A
A
∂eA
+ δθ˜
∂θ˜
∂eA
+ φ0(GA)
∂GA
∂eA
− ϕ0(E) ∂E
∂eA
#
= 0, (A2)
∂WB
∂τB
= −∂p
B
B
∂τB
+ φ0(GB)
∂GB
∂τB
− ϕ0(E) ∂E
∂τB
= 0, (A3)
∂WB
∂tB
= − 1
C00(eB)
∙
−∂p
B
B
∂eB
+ φ0(GB)
∂GB
∂eB
− ϕ0(E) ∂E
∂eB
¸
= 0. (A4)
Next, we have from equation (3) that, for i = A,B, ∂pii/∂τ i = 1, ∂p
i
i/∂ei = −eiC 00(ei).
Moreover, from (20), ∂θ˜/∂τA = 1/δ, ∂θ˜/∂eA = −eAC 00(eA)/δ, ∂θ˜/∂τB = −1/δ, ∂θ˜/∂eB
= eBC 00(eB)/δ. Differentiate equations (27) and (12) partially with respect to τA, eA,
and equations (28) and (12) partially with respect to τB, eB. We have
∂GA
∂τA
= 1− θ˜ − 1
δ
[pA − C(eA)] ,
∂GA
∂eA
=
£
−eAC 00(eA)− C 0(eA)
¤
(1− θ˜) + 1
δ
eAC 00(eA) [pA − C(eA)] ,
∂E
∂τA
=
1
δ
(eB − eA),
∂E
∂eA
= 1− θ˜ − 1
δ
eAC 00(eA)(eB − eA),
∂GB
∂τB
= 1 + θ˜ − 1
δ
[pB − C(eB)] ,
∂GB
∂eB
=
£
−eBC 00(eB)−C 0(eB)
¤
(1 + θ˜) +
1
δ
eBC 00(eB) [pB −C(eB)] ,
∂E
∂τB
= −1
δ
(eB − eA),
∂E
∂eB
= 1 + θ˜ +
1
δ
eBC 00(eB)(eB − eA).
Evaluating these derivatives at θ˜ = 0, substituting the resulting values in (A1)—(A4)
and simplifying yield equations (23)—(24) in the text.
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Proof of Proposition 4: we have from equation (2) that, as with the origin-origin
case,for i = A,B, ∂pii/∂τ i = 1, ∂p
i
i/∂ei = −eiC00(ei). Moreover, from (26)— (20),
∂θ˜/∂τA = 0, ∂θ˜/∂eA = −eAC 00(eA)/δ, ∂θ˜/∂τB = 0, ∂θ˜/∂eB = eBC 00(eB)/δ. It then
follows from partial differentiation of equations (21) and (12) with respect to τA, eA,
and equations (22) and (12) with respect to τB, eB, that
∂GA
∂τA
= 1,
∂GA
∂eA
=
£
−eAC 00(eA)− C 0(eA)
¤
(1− θ˜)− 1
δ
e2AC
0(eA)C 00(eA),
∂E
∂τA
= 0,
∂E
∂eA
= 1− θ˜ − 1
δ
eAC 00(eA)(eB − eA),
∂GB
∂τB
= 1,
∂GB
∂eB
=
£
−eBC 00(eB)− C0(eB)
¤
(1 + θ˜)− 1
δ
e2BC
0(eB)C 00(eB),
∂E
∂τB
= 0,
∂E
∂eB
= 1 + θ˜ +
1
δ
eBC 00(eB)(eB − eA).
Evaluating these derivatives at θ˜ = 0, substituting the resulting values in (A1)—(A4)
and simplifying, yield equations (29)—(30) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 5: Differentiate equations (33) and (12) partially with respect
to τA, eA, and equations (34) and (12) partially with respect to τB, eB. We have
∂GA
∂τA
= 1− θ˜ − 1
δ
£
pAA − C(eA)
¤
,
∂GA
∂eA
=
£
−eAC 00(eA)− C0(eA)
¤
(1− θ˜) + 1
δ
eAC 00(eA)
£
pAA − C(eA)
¤
,
∂E
∂τA
=
1
δ
(eB − eA),
∂E
∂eA
= 1− θ˜ − 1
δ
eAC 00(eA)(eB − eA),
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∂GB
∂τB
= 1,
∂GB
∂eB
= −(1 + θ˜)
£
eBC 00(eB) + C 0(eB)
¤
− 1
δ
e2BC
0(eB)C 00(eB),
∂E
∂τB
= 0,
∂E
∂eB
= 1 + θ˜ +
1
δ
eBC 00(eB)(eB − eA).
Substituting from above in (A1)—(A4) and simplifying, yield equations (35)—(38) in the
text.
The (O,D) subgame with θ˜ < 0:
Assume that the marginal consumer is in country B (with a destination regime). It
now follows from the expressions for pBA and p
B
B in (31) that,
θ˜ =
pBA − pBB
δ
=
qA + τA − qB
δ
. (A5)
And, with the pattern of taxation in the two countries,
GA =
£
pAA − C(eA)
¤
(1− θ˜), (A6)
GB =
£
pBB − C(eB)
¤
(θ˜ + 1)− θ˜τB = pBB − C(eB)− θ˜eBC 0(eB). (A7)
This is the same specification as for θ˜ > 0. As previously, θ˜ is independent of τB.
Differentiate equation (16) with respect to τA, tA, and equation (18) with respect to
τB, tB. We have
∂WA
∂τA
= −∂p
A
A
∂τA
+ φ0(GA)
∂GA
∂τA
− ϕ0(E) ∂E
∂τA
= 0, (A8)
∂WA
∂eA
= − 1
C 00(eA)
∙
−∂p
A
A
∂eA
+ φ0(GA)
∂GA
∂eA
− ϕ0(E) ∂E
∂eA
¸
= 0, (A9)
∂WB
∂τB
= −∂p
B
B
∂τB
+ δθ˜
∂θ˜
∂τB
+ φ0(GB)
∂GB
∂τB
− ϕ0(E) ∂E
∂τB
= 0, (A10)
∂WB
∂eB
= − 1
C 00(eB)
"
−∂p
B
B
∂eB
+ δθ˜
∂θ˜
∂eB
+ φ0(GB)
∂GB
∂eB
− ϕ0(E) ∂E
∂eB
#
= 0. (A11)
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Next differentiate equations (A6) and (12) partially with respect to τA, eA, and equa-
tions (A7) and (12) partially with respect to τB, eB. The expressions for these deriva-
tives will be equivalent to those we derived for θ˜ > 0. Substituting in (A8)—(A11) and
simplifying, yield equations (A12)—(A15) below. We have
Proposition 6 The Nash equilibrium allocations, and the supporting prices and taxes,
in the (O,D) subgame are determined by equations (1), (3), (A5), (A6), (A7), (12) and
∙
1− θ˜ − 1
δ
τA +
1
δ
eBC 0(eA)
¸
φ0(GA) = 1, (A12)
− C 0(eA) =
ϕ0(E)
φ0(GA)
, (A13)
φ0(GB) = 1, (A14)£
C 0(eB) + ϕ0(E)
¤ ∙
1 + θ˜ +
1
δ
e2BC
00(eB)
¸
= eBC00(eB)
eAϕ0(E)
δ
, (A15)
provided that in equilibrium θ˜ < 0.
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